

DE: I think there are a number of new people here, and this time I want certainly to allow and encourage more discussion than I allowed the last couple of times. So it would be good to know our names. Could we go around the room once -- some here were here before -- and just say out your name loudly.

[Attendees state names]

DE: Now, I think it's worth spending both sessions this week on this basic material that was in the reading last time. How many people actually have read it, in fact? Let me see, so I'll know who And now, the ones who did not read it. The dunce caps.

Okay. Now, it's not too late. Do you all have a copy now? Was there enough for everyone? Of course, the other reading was the Milgram. I didn't ask. Does that include people who raised their hands? Did you have a chance to look at the Milgram? That's great. I've never sat in a room with people who have actually read that before and had the chance to discuss it, so I'm looking forward to having that. And I would really rather not spend much time, for those of you who haven't read it maybe we'll do a minimum of describing what we're talking about, but I don't want to spend a lot of time on that, and ask you, really, those of you who can, to look at it before Thursday. We'll more or less continue discussion, because there's a lot of application and discussion to go with.

Maybe I could ask. Does anybody volunteer to give a brief description for those people who haven't read it at all? Clarify it in your own mind, crystallize it? I'll do it if I have to.

COMMENT: You have to.

DE: Come on. Somebody be a -- not you.

COMMENT: Well, I can start. The Milgram experiments are a series, actually, of about eighteen experiments done over a period of more than a year in New Haven, and a couple of experiments were done in Bridgeport. These experiments intended to test to what extent people would follow the instructions of an authority. The series of experiments did this in a variety of ways that basically used the same experimental technique, and that was to invite people to a psychology laboratory initially in the basement of a building at Yale University, and the people invited in were answering ads in the newspaper which asked them to participate. When they got there they were part of a rigged drawing which presumably was part of an experiment to test learning. And the set up was that there would be a stooge along with the experimenter. And in the drawing the stooge and the person coming in from the outside would choose, and the stooge would always become the "learner" and the naive subject coming in would be the "teacher." And the teacher job was to read paired words to the learner who was supposed to learn a particular word sequence and report it back. But the learner always failed a certain amount of the time. And the teacher's job, which was explained to him by the experimenter when he got there, was to deliver shock -- and they had a large, fancy-looking machine and would deliver a shock of increasing intensity by flipping a little switch to the learner, who was strapped in a chair. And the shock started at 15 volts and went all the way up to 450 volts.

However, this was all rigged. Although this person was strapped to the chair, the learner, who was the colleague of the experimenter, never actually got a real electric shock.

And the learner had various things to do. He was an actor, basically, throughout the experiment. At a certain level, I think it was 150 volts, he would yell and say, "This hurts too much, I want it stopped." And at 225 volts he would scream. He would say, "Let me out of here, I refuse to participate any further." And at another level, maybe it's 300 and something volts, he would continue to scream and scream with each increasing level of shock, and then he would say, "Let me out of here. I refuse to participate." And then he would be silent from then on. Always the experimenter, when the naive subject asked him for instructions, the experimenter always said a certain ritualized set of responses, like "Please continue the experiment. It's urgent that you continue the experiment." If the naive subject asks is there something happening to the man, is he getting sick, or something like that, the experimenter would say the shock can be painful but it doesn't produce any permanent tissue damage. And with those stock replies, the person who would come in would continue to go however high he would go. And what they were interested, then, in measuring is, at what point will people coming in in response to a newspaper ad break off the experiment and refuse to continue. In the early experiments, the learner, the man who was screaming and yelling and presumably getting shocked, was in another room. Later on they did variations which brought the learner in closer proximity to the naive subject so that he didn't just have to hear him screaming in another room. He'd have to look at him, look at him squirming in the

chair and so forth. In another variation the experimenter was out of the office and the naive subject would have contact with the experimenter only by the telephone.

What most of these experiments -- I can't remember all the variations; there's a number of other interesting variations -- but basically what happened was that to a surprising extent the naive subjects who were delivering the shocks would continue to deliver shocks all the way up to the maximum possible shock on the machine. Often they would be upset, often they would complain, "Gee, I think this guy is not doing very well. Maybe you should go check him."

In another variation of the experiment the stooge said, apparently casually at the beginning, that he had a heart condition. All of these things were designed to presumably make it progressively more difficult for the naive subject to continue to deliver presumably very painful shocks.

I don't think I should describe the subtle variations of the authority and things like that.

DE: Very good. Better than I could have done. That's really good. And now I've confirmed that one person really did read this, which I might have worried about.

COMMENT: Were these all men?

COMMENT: Alas, no, my dear.

DE: As a matter of fact, the first set of experiments was done with

all males. But eventually they deliberately then did do sets with females and found that the results were almost exactly the same, with the exception that the amount of feeling of resistance, the anguish, the concern, seemed greater on the part of the women. More crying, more nervousness, more feeling that this was wrong, which also occurred in the men, but that was even stronger in the women. And yet they continued to do it, if anything to a slightly higher degree than the earlier experiments with the men.

In fact, another set of experiments who really didn't believe, who felt that somehow secretly the subjects must believe that there was no pain involved, that they must subconsciously disbelieve what they claimed to believe, that they really were delivering shocks. So they tried to do the experiment with real pain being delivered, of course on an animal, a dog, as we've been reading about experiments at Harvard. So they had a grid with what was described as a fluffy, cute puppy, who was actually getting shocks, but actually not, of course, the level of shocks they were describing. Just enough to make it jump up and down and squeal in some pain. But supposedly no real damage, ultimately. But the puppy was clearly in pain. And this was done mainly with women. The assumption was, you know, what woman could watch a puppy receive these shocks? And the answer is, they essentially went all the way. Everybody. Including the women. The experiment has been done in Germany where the results were that a somewhat higher percentage of people actually went all the way, but it's a very marginal difference, in fact.

Now, those who've read it now and feel, for the benefit of others who haven't read it, do you think of things that haven't been said

that need saying at this point?

COMMENT: I thought it was significant that peoples' expectations of what they might do under those circumstances were higher than what actually happened.

DE: Higher in the sense that they thought they would step off, they thought they would be disobedient. Yes. In fact, if I can relate that right away to the Kellman material -- and I'll summarize that very quickly, again, for those who haven't read it, but I hope you read it -- Kellman has a great deal of conjecture and analysis of compliance behavior, not all of which he presents data for. But he does present some new data based on a poll that he had done for him, Roper professional random sample, large-scale random sample, done just after, or, actually, a month or two after the Caley verdict in which Caley had been given life sentence for My Lai massacre, but then the President had intervened and got into the case, lowered the sentence, removed him from his immediate imprisonment at that time. Kellman and other collaborators were very struck by the fact that it was very evident in the public that there was widespread hostility toward the verdict and the sentence, and very strong approval for Nixon's intervention in favor of Caley. And they wanted to investigate that, so they had a poll, the result of which was that when asked what the person being polled would do if they found themselves being asked in a combat situation to massacre men, women and children, everyone in a village in a situation like Vietnam, fifty-one percent of the respondents all across the board said they would have done what Caley would

do. Their self image was, in fact, that this was the right thing to do, they would do what the right thing to do was, and that would be to carry out the orders. Moreover, a much higher percentage said that they felt Caley should not have been tried, that Caley was not responsible, Caley had not done anything he should be And another thing was that, again, across the board, people tended to predict that other people would agree with this, would condone this action.

COMMENT: But would they have said that ... in context. If they hadn't been defending Caley, if somebody said would you go in to, put into the context of World War II, a hypothetical, would you go into --

DE: Oh, well, that is the hypothetical. If you're in a village -- it wasn't related to Caley initially on the question. Eventually it got to Caley. I think they did not start out, as I recall, with questions on Caley. I might be wrong. Does somebody remember? I think they started out on more general, hypothetical questions and then got into Caley. Of course, Caley was in the news. It was probably in peoples' minds.

But one thing that struck me was, and I discussed this with Kellman, and he didn't make as much of a point of this in his analysis as he might of, and it's the point you raised. That one of the phenomena being attacked here or exposed is the mispredictions, the misunderstanding of a certain number of the people as to how they would behave. Specifically, those who felt that they would not shoot, they would not obey these orders -- immoral, you can't kill civilians like that, this was clearly an illegal order, I wouldn't do it -- also

predicted that most people would have the same reaction. Now, that was wrong, meaning that they misunderstood the relation of their own attitudes to that of the population. They thought of themselves as being in the majority, they thought that their refusal or predicted refusal was what was expected by the society. They felt sustained. They did not feel they were in a minority in this position. You know, 'I know others would shoot, but I myself ...'

Now, in the country, those who felt they would not shoot felt that this was perfectly natural, this was the way the society would judge, and everybody would agree with this, whether they would do it or not. This was mistaken. They were mispredicting the majority. And the majority of people were saying, on the contrary, I would do it, and most people would do it, and most people would condone it. Those people were right. They didn't have a misperception. The people who said they would do it correctly saw that they were in the majority. The people who predicted they would not do it, whether they're right or wrong, had a misconception of the nature of majority attitudes at that point.

Now, that bears on one other thing. Kellman, in trying to sort of let the American respondents a little bit off the hook, make their answers seem a little less horrifying, conjectures that those people who said that they would shoot would not necessarily do so. This is their hypothetical answer. This is their answer to a hypothetical situation. We shouldn't assume that in the actual situation.

Now let me ask people now who've read both Kellman and Milgram, do you agree with that conjecture? I'm hinting in my own attitude here, but have you thought about that?

COMMENT: I think they would do it.

DE: Why?

COMMENT: If they say they would do it, I think it would be far easier for them to do it. People who thought in advance of the Milgram experiment that, "no, no, no, no one would do that, it would be too I just think they would.

DE: Anybody else have a thought on that comment?

COMMENT: Well, it's also true that Milgram points out in a discussion of his experiments that people misunderstand the importance of context, and that when they're answering that question they're answering out of a position which assumes they're somehow independent of a context. Whereas when they're imbedded in a the situation, their feeling about it no longer is relevant, and their actions are no longer determined anywheres near so much by these kind of theorizings that we're talking about.

DE: Uh-huh. Any other comments on this?

COMMENT: I was struck by the fact that some of the people did not respond at all to the moral or ethical side of torture in the Milgram book, that they were responding totally to authority, and that was the highest order, and the only order. And so if they said that they would do that, then I think that some of those people certainly

wouldn't hesitate at all.

DE: You mentioned one thing -- a slight digression -- but you just used the word torture. I've had two long discussions with Migram on this: one years ago, and one after I'd just read the book. And he showed me the movie at that time that's been done of this. How many people have seen the movie? Yeah, it's seen around quite a bit. And the other was just a couple of months ago, and we spent about ten hours talking with him over this thing, most of the night and next morning. And the first time I'd met him I'd asked him how it was that he hadn't used the word torture in his book. And he said, it had never occurred to him in all this experiment. What is being done is torture at some level. I mean, that's a rather natural description. And I thought that what he had in mind was an examination of the circumstances under which randomly selected people, more or less, could be induced to become torturers. And he claimed that he had -- well, he said he had never conceptualized it that way. He was trying to find analogies, and he mentions Vietnam and various things, and the Nazis, the extermination camp, which, of course, he doesn't think of as torture. But he had now thought of it, and this second time that I saw him he said, you know, you had an influence on me, and he showed me the preface to the French edition of his book. He said, look, I've put the word torture in.

This, though, odd resistance -- by the way, let me give you one more footnote about the origins of that which I learned, of the experiment. He said a number of things to me that indicated that when he had first conceived of this experiment it had been his intention to --

this is what I inferred from what he was saying -- to demonstrate that a lot of people could be like the Germans, could act like the Germans, that this was what was in his mind, that it occurred to him that this would be a way of demonstrating this. As I say, he said this by a number of ways, but then he would always very quickly and say, or if I pointed this out he would deny that, then he would say it again. He would say, no, I wanted to find out what people would do. And emphasize very much this was scientific, I wasn't looking for any particular results in this, it was totally surprising to me, and so forth. But then when he told me about the examples -- examples were the Germans, and so forth -- and it so happened, this is maybe unfair to tell, but maybe not. What the hell. I was talking with his wife who had been with him through this entire series of experiments, and I turned to her at one point and said -- we hadn't discussed this in front of her, and she had mentioned that she recalled very well the very first experiment when he first thought of it, and how he thought of doing it, what he was going to do. In fact, he'd met her at about that time. He told her in great excitement. And I said, oh, how did he describe what he was going to do? And she said, he was going to show how far people would go in doing this, in this torture. And he said, no, no, I was going to find out. And she said, no, I remember quite clearly you were going to show Well, I may be undermining a little bit the force of the results because I think he was not quite as surprised by these results as is emphasized in the book.

But the fact is they have been done now, replicated by a lot of people, some of whom did disbelieve the results and did set out to disprove them and were surprised as they recorded to discover that

they were getting these results very reliably.

But how this relates to the question that was raised here is, I agree with you, that when one reads the protocols, the descriptions of these peoples' predictions of their own behavior -- and the students were asked, how do you expect to behave in this torturing experiment -- typically, then, a large number of people would say, I wouldn't go beyond this level. Some of them would say, well, I wouldn't give any shocks at all, or I would give very few shocks. Then they would explain why they wouldn't, because immoral; doesn't justify; I don't want to cause pain; I can't stand to see suffering. And, indeed, lots of people gave every evidence that they didn't like to see suffering, that it was painful for them. But it wasn't determining. Their dislike of the pain was not determining.

And as you point out, the people who are making these predictions are, of course, answering a hypothetical question, are not imagining all the context that they'll be in, but there's more to it than that, because you have to say, well, what are the salient parts? What are the critical controlling parts of that context? Kellman is conjecturing that the sight of blood, the presence of human victims -- and this would be what most people would conjecture -- that's the part of the context that is left out by these people who imagine that they would shoot. They're just not realizing how difficult it would be to shoot. My conjecture is, your conjecture is, he's wrong. Indeed, they're showing rather good self knowledge about what will really be controlling in that situation. The people who vividly imagine the pain of the victim, whether a massacre victim or a shock victim, are quite plausibly imagining something that will inhibit them from inflicting

the pain or the massacre. But they're mistaken, to our surprise, I guess. We didn't think up this experiment. We are surprised by the results, I think, maybe more than Milgram was. I think, by the way, Milgram was, indeed, surprised by the extremity of the results. Almost no one has ever been reported to have been anything but surprised at the actual results, how many people would go all the way. But this is the kind of thing he was, I think, expecting to show.

But for those of us who are surprised, and who are in this category of people who don't correctly predict how people behave, clearly what we've left out is the force of that element of authority and of orders. It is not our self image, and we were not taught to have this self image. We are not socialized to understand consciously the power of authority.

Another conjecture: does Germany differ at all? Not so much behaviorally it would appear from the actual results in the Milgram experiment. But it is possible to suppose that in Germany obedience to authority is more consciously legitimized than it is in our culture. Certainly even I, as a visitor over the last few years to Germany a number of times in connection with the Euromissiles, even a casual visitor will run across instances quickly in Germany of people using phrases like, 'you have to do that, that's only obeying orders' kind of thing. In fact, I learned the phrase "we're only doing our duty" because a few weeks ago I was sitting in front of the Ministry of Defense at three in the morning because they had learned there was going to be a blockade at the Ministry of Defense in Bonn. 3,000 people turned out. So they were going to get the people there at 4 in the morning, so we had to be there at 3 in the morning to blockade it.

And the police were under instructions to be very, very gentle, very nice, which they were to a fault, actually, because we were there to get arrested and they frustrated this desire. They would move us around without arresting us so there would be no court case and there wouldn't be the drama of arrests, or anything. They would actually physically move us. I've never experienced this in the States. It could be done, and save them all this money. It beats civil disobedience, basically, as a dramatic tactic. I have a feeling there's a legal difference. It's almost never done over here.

But anyway, I vividly recall the uniformed policeman in charge of this saying repeatedly, at night, under the lights, in German, translated for me: You must understand we are not doing this because we disagree with you. We do not disagree with you politically -- many of them didn't. Police would say, we're on your side, we are only doing our duty.

And so I learned in German how to say, and did manage to say to this policeman, one time, I hope you understand, we are only doing our duty. I have forgotten how you say that in German. I learned it for the moment.

Anyway, you run into this a lot. And I have the feeling that the idea that it's right to obey orders to almost any degree is more legitimized openly. We don't recognize that as something we learned in school, that there are no limits to what authority can reasonably ask, that it is not yours to question, yours is not to reason why, and so forth. Do we? There may be institutions. I would take a guess, I would imagine that Catholic schools would get that a bit more. But when we learn about the Revolution, the Declaration of Independence

and all that, and what it means to be a good citizen, I don't think we learn that authority is not to be questioned under any circumstances, do whatever you're told, there are no limits on what authority may reason What Milgram and Kellman suggest together is that that's the working reality, and somehow we learn it. We learn it. But I raise the question: are we told that? I don't have all the answers to this.

COMMENT: I think so. I mean, I can just imagine parents saying to kids, don't question the teacher. You're wrong. If you get thrown out of school, you're the one who made a mistake.

COMMENT: You have to obey the rules.

DE: But all parents, to the degree that this uniformity of behavior appears?

COMMENT: Well, it doesn't sound like the way you described it in Germany, because we don't really have --

COMMENT: That you would do anything for freedom. You would do anything to safeguard this country.

DE: But anything you're ordered to do.

COMMENT: As long as you were safeguarding freedom.

COMMENT: I teach upper middle class students, and it's amazing to watch the reactions of Granada and what's in _____ El Salvador. And it's as if the 60's never happened, which, of course, for them, it did never happen. One student came to me today and said, look, my roommate says we have to accept what Reagan did in Granada because he's the President. And if you question him you're unpatriotic. So the kid said to me, what can I suggest he read? I said, why don't you get another roommate? But that wasn't the right answer. I did suggest some things that he might have his roommate read. But I find that over and over again. The Young Republican Club is the fastest growing club that we have from what I can tell. And an amazing amount of -- I teach a course on the nuclear threat, and a student today said, look, you assign this, you assign that, this authority says that, that authority says something else. She says, which authority am I to believe? And my colleague and I tried to get across that she didn't have to choose the one that sounded nicest or looked nicest, but she could evaluate the evidence, she could bring her own values to the case, and so on and so forth. And it was kind of like, what are you talking about? One has to choose an authority and respond to it.

Now, I'm troubled by what I think you're saying, that we're not overtly taught the way the Germans are, and the very crass way of you have to obey --

DE: Maybe I'm wrong. I'm open to --

COMMENT: No, I think it's subtler than that. I think, in fact, what you said I remember that -- I'm from the lower middle class, I think

there's a class issue here, too. Lower middle class -- whenever I was upset with something that went on in school, the teacher was always right, where she's right because she's the teacher and you have to understand that.

In the upper middle class I have the sense the students' parent may go in and argue with the teacher, but then the parent is right. I mean, the point is, somebody is the ultimate authority, and ultimately one relies on the authority of the social class system or consumer values or the President or something.

DE: Well, let me raise two questions here, though. One hears a lot about how the new generation coming along -- and this has been true for ten years, at least -- that there's a trend toward conservatism and a reaction, a conscious brainwashing counteraction to the mood of the 60's among all institutions, and that's had a good deal of effect. And we select students this way --

Remember that the Milgram and Kellman phenomena are both in the 60's. They're student phenomena and adult phenomena, in the 60's. Remember that the Kellman survey was in June of 1961. In fact, I was really struck by the date.

COMMENT: '71.

DE: What'd I say, '61? '71. Right in '71. In other words, right after the height of the Vietnam education. There's an odd coincidence there. I noticed that here his investigation was of attitudes toward obedience, to authority, of which the key element was what had seemed

to be a positive reaction to Caley's obedience to authority, and the poll was completed, I think he says in there, like the 9th to the 11th of June, 1971. Well, that's a very meaningful date to me because on June 13th the New York Times began printing 7,000 pages of top secret material that someone had disobediently given to the New York Times, namely, me. So that it seemed if he'd done that poll just a week later, I'm sure he would have, given his interest as he confirmed to me, inevitably have included in the poll this rather striking example of disobedience. And I would have poll added (?) data on attitudes to the Pentagon Papers which actually I have never seen. The White House did private polling on reactions to the Pentagon Papers, but they did not release the results, which, I suppose, should be reassuring to me, actually.

COMMENT: But coming back to the question of how people get taught or end up kind of being oriented one way or another on this -- because I think Kellman makes a nice, clear argument about how it's not conservative-liberal, it's not a dimension that counts. It has something to do with what he calls being normatively integrated into the political system. That is, you're rule bound, and then you look to what the authority says, you follow it, you give up your personal responsibility and hopefully you don't get blamed. Versus someone who is looking for their own, what he calls, ideologically integrated somebody who's in a way got to feel that it's kind of a -- they'll internalize the values, and win by them, but they'll also challenge and question authority there for ... feels like the system isn't reflecting what they're buying into. And I was thinking about that question, what determines,

is clearly, although SES is a big part of it, there's variation. I was thinking of my brother-in-law, who's a doctor who, when you ask him about the nuclear threat, gives you the perfect Kellman denying responsibility stance; that is, they can't do anything about it, and just, verbatim.

So, anyway, I only had one thought about it, and I do think it's a key question. My sister went to public school. I went to private school. That reflects a lot about our family already, ... boys and girls are supposed to do. But nonetheless, my sister, who's smarter than me, I think, and always got A's in school, was telling me about how she knew what the teachers wanted to hear. She always got A's. She always knew what to write, what they wanted to hear, and what the right authority said. I never got taught to do that in school. I got good grades, but I didn't always get A's. But I always was _____ about what I thought, and I felt I was taught to do that in my school.

own thinking is put above the authority. That's what counts. How do you evaluate it? How do you come to your criteria? Let me put that out as a starter, because I think I have been encouraged to do that.

DE: I would have said that. In fact, let me just see how idiosyncratic these reactions are, just a straw poll. How many people here have the feeling that they were taught, in your own education -- well, let's say first, to make your opinion, tell the teacher when they're wrong, and so forth.

COMMENT: Yes and no.

DE: And how many felt clearly on the other side that the main message was say what you're supposed to say.

COMMENT: You were one of my teachers.

DE: Yeah, but which way did you answer?

It's kind of even, isn't it?

COMMENT: Well no, a little more answer what authority says.

DE: It's a small sample here.

COMMENT: But at the same time, I haven't read Milgram for a long time, but it seems to me there were no differences by social class or education.

DE: He didn't test a whole lot. He didn't discover much of a difference.

COMMENT: He didn't identify it well enough to talk about --

DE: Well, there's another aspect though about the Kellman -- first, one thing that excites me very much about the Kellman in combination with the Milgram. I think he adds something of great importance. I felt when I read Milgram, which was ten years ago, almost, the early 70's when I read the book, that it was explaining something to me of great importance, which was how -- how many, again, were here last time, and how many weren't? Okay, so those who were here remember

that I mentioned that a phenomenon that I had been directly exposed to was this, let me describe it: As of 1968, with the Tet offensive, the great majority of the American people along with their authority, Walter Cronkite, decided that the war really was stalemated, really was hopeless, was not worth continuing. That we were caught in a stalemate which did not offer enough promise to continue. And whether they saw it as immoral or not, they turned against the continuation of the war and really were prepared to get out from that time out. What Walter Cronkite actually said soon after the Tet offensive was we are in a stalemate and we should be seeking to negotiate out. And Johnson said to his aids at that time, if we've lost Walter Cronkite, we've lost the country. So there's an authority. But he was reflecting what everybody was feeling.

This continued to be the case. It never changed again. After the Tet offensive the mood of the country turned against the continuation of the Vietnam war, and got even stronger. I recall the day, because it was the day of tear gas in Washington, buses drawn up in front of the White House during the Cambodian incursion, when there were a couple hundred thousand people in Washington protesting there. This was after Kent State. And going into a drug store to get what had been said to be good against tear gas, because my wife and I had just gotten a lot of tear gas, and they said lemon juice was supposed to be good. So we went in there to get some lemonade or something to put on our faces. And I remember picking up the Washington Post and it said: This week for the first time the Roper, or I think it was the Harris poll, shows a majority of the American people now believe -- 1970 -- continuation of the war is immoral. It had never been

close to that before.

And by the way, it stayed that way. You will often hear retrospectives on the war to this day that say the American people never thought the war was immoral. They thought that it was costly and hopeless, but they didn't say it was immoral. That's wrong. By 1970 a majority of the American people said continuation of the war was immoral. That it was wrong -- second question -- ever to have gotten in. It was a mistake from the beginning to have gotten in. It was wrong, immoral to continue. 1970. The war had five years to go then.

But what struck me now was this piece of information that I knew from the Pentagon, which is not widely shared, and that is that the mood in the Pentagon was not different from the mood in the country. The proportion, if anything, of people who felt the war should end after about March of 1968 is higher in the Pentagon, because the Pentagon was loaded with people who had been to Vietnam. And that affected your thinking in a variety of ways.

I was working, for example, on the Pentagon Papers at that time in a team of 36 people whose main characteristic was -- they were mostly military men, officers -- was that they had been to Vietnam. Vietnam experience was a criterion for this. Some form of research, preferably social science or historical research, was also a secondary factor, but most of them didn't have that. They were just Vietnam officers, the kind I'd worked with in Vietnam. Really quite a random sample. One of them, one of the executive officers, Paul Gorman, then a lieutenant colonel, is now the commander of southern command, the guy in charge of Central America at this moment. A general. Very smart guy, who later had the job of advising the prosecution for two

years during my trial. But no hard feelings or anything. He was just doing his duty. And in the case of Vietnam he felt we should get out of Vietnam. I'm saying this to say he had none of the characteristics that you would ascribe to a dove. He was likely to be a general, he could be chief of staff, he was a perfectly straightforward combat officer.

I'll tell you another. You may recall a guy who was fired from the White House staff but given another good job because he had said that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable, and that we should -- remember this incident? It was under Reagan. He was Chief of Staff for the NFC. A guy name Schweitzer. Highly decorated. One of the most decorated men. He was another member of this group doing the Pentagon Papers whom I knew very well. All of these men felt it was wrong to continue the war, it was hopeless, we should get out.

The war went on, as I say, for seven years after that, and was fought for those seven years almost entirely by people who believed that it should end and that we should be out of it. That whatever hopes they had had going into Vietnam -- as I myself had had -- whatever good intentions they thought had justified their involvement, no longer justified our continuing the war. There was a saying in '68 in Washington that I heard from several people: There were three people in this town who still believed in the Vietnam war: Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk, and Walt Rostow, who was his NFC advisor. And that was as many as anyone could come up with. That was not hyperbole. No one could think of anyone they knew in the Pentagon or in the State Department who believed in what we were following, continuing the bombing, making gestures at negotiations, keeping the troops

over there, and so forth.

At that point we had dropped as many bombs as we dropped in all of Germany in World War II, a million and a half tons of bombs. Clark Clifford came in and gets much credit for turning the policy around. His main deputy on this, Assistant Secretary of Defense, was Paul Warnky, who wanted the war to be over, had never believed in it from the beginning. He had pretty much the attitudes that are familiar to those of you who listen to him now. Warnky and Clifford dropped as many bombs in the next ten months as McNamara had dropped in the previous three years. They dropped 1.7 million tons of bombs in the next ten months of 1968. That added up to 3.2 or one-and-a-half World War IIs. We dropped two million tons in all of World War II. Nixon and Kissinger, then, in one term, in the next four years, dropped four-and-a-half million more tons, or two more World War IIs. Or to put it one further way, McNamara left, having fought to the end to keep a ceiling on the bombing, tried to get the bombing over, and in effect when he finally came out and said privately to Johnson, in a document so secret that it was not in the Pentagon Papers -- let me explain what that means. We had the full run of his files. Our study was done in McNamara's suite of offices, next to his private office. And we had the full run of his files on Vietnam, which was our main source in this huge study. We had some access to State Department and a little bit to the White House, and some to the JCS. But mainly it was the SEC DEF files. There were a few things we ran across in the course of that that were no longer in the SEC DEF files. And this document was so secret that it was not in his files and we didn't know of its existence at all. It came out in Johnson's memoirs, actually,

[Side 2, Tape 1]

from the White House files.

Why was it so secret? Because what he was saying was, the time has come to negotiate directly with the NLF, envision a sharing of power in Vietnam. Stop the bombing, it's absolutely hopeless. He had been critical of the bombing for about a year prior to that, and in particular in May of that year, '67 -- we did have that memo. But in the fall of '67 he then said [end of Side 1]

DE: ... because my boss, John McNaughton, of Harvard, who was Assistant Secretary, told me that he had heard of them. He himself had not seen them. They'd been given to McNamara and given to the President. This is the so-called devil's advocate role of _____. In other words, a document saying to the President what you were doing is heading toward disaster. It must be stopped. An internal document by a strong authority, in this case a Deputy Secretary of State, was so hot that it couldn't even be seen by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. It might leak. The public might discover that there was some dissent, that the authorities were not unified in their desire. The President might not be doing what all of his informed subordinates believed was necessary, and so forth. So that was not to be circulated, simply. As I say, likewise the McNamara memo. What was the fate of McNamara, then, when that insider at the top changed his mind? He was fired, instantly. Removed from the system.

In fact, let me tell you this anecdote. This is coming back to me. He was given the job -- well, actually, I know how it happened because I was talking to people who were very close to him the day

that it happened. Of course they let it out that his ambitions were being satisfied. He was being made head of the World Bank. He had always wanted to be head of the World Bank, and now the President was giving him this opportunity to be head of the World Bank. In fact, Alan Entoven (?) had had breakfast with him that morning, a working breakfast, had gone over many plans of what he wanted to do in the next year and all this. He had no inkling of what was coming.

McNamara went to the White House and was informed by Johnson that Johnson had decided to give him what he's always wanted, because McNamara had once, years before, said some day I would like to be President of the World Bank. But in his thought, after my job is done, after a couple of terms here as Secretary of Defense.

Now, the clear reason for getting him out of there fast was the fear -- Johnson believed with certainty that Bobby Kennedy would be his opponent in 1968. And McNamara was very close to Bobby Kennedy. McNamara's number one characteristic in his own mind was loyalty, and he retains this to this day, pretty much. But loyalty to whom? And Johnson's bet was that to McNamara's surprise, McNamara would find himself cooperating with Bobby Kennedy. In fact, his suspicion when he eventually learned of the Pentagon Papers was that McNamara had been manipulated into providing this history of the war so as to provide Bobby Kennedy with material when Bobby finally ran. And it could be the case, I don't know. McNamara denied that, but wouldn't necessarily know.

Anyway, Johnson, by other people's calculation who knew him, was sure that McNamara would follow his loyalty to Bobby Kennedy -- and he was against the war anyway -- would leave the Secretary of Defense,

join Bobby in his campaign, so he was preempting that by putting him in a position where, in theory, he could not talk, as an international civil servant. He was not supposed to express opinions on American public policy. So he was putting him on ice before the campaign ran, before Bobby got in. Remember, this was at a period when Bobby was saying I'm not going to run, I won't challenge, I'm loyal to the party, I'm not going to challenge the _____ President, and so forth. Which he said almost up until the moment that he ran. And I recall, in this context -- it's an interesting anecdote -- seeing Adam Walenski, who was Bobby Kennedy's main assistant at that time. Adam was pressing Bobby to run. And everybody who knew McNamara -- there was great indignity to this being stripped out. It was assumed by everybody, contrary to McNamara, that he was being fired, suddenly, with no warning. That was the way it really did get out. And so it was fairly humiliating. We also knew, without having read that memo, we knew McNamara's attitude, and the idea that he was leaving and was going to be replaced by Clifford, who was a known hawk, was extremely disheartening to everybody who wanted to see the war over. So you wanted McNamara to fight on this issue, refuse to resign, refuse to take this job, or tell what he knew. It was crucial that he tell what he knew. And I talked to several people that day on this situation, and I remember Walenski then telling me, he said, do you think, he said, my boss, Bobby, has been after him all day. You must not resign on this. You must refuse to resign. And if you're fired, you must get out and say what you believe about the war, that the bombing was useless and so forth. And this was actually, I had this conversation a little later, when McNamara had just done his ceremony of leaving

the building. He cried, and they had the usual honor guard for him and everything. And he expressed his gratitude to the President for giving him this job that he had always wanted. The World Bank, and how wonderful the President was for doing that. And Walenski said he was like the faithful employee who at a dinner or luncheon, when he's leaving the firm after 30 years and he's being given a gold watch because he never spent too much time in the men's room and was always on time, you know, did the overtime when it was called for. And he gets the gold watch in the end. And this was McNamara, head of the Ford Foundation. And Mark Raskin's comment, I remember that same week we were talking about it, was this man went from Harvard Business School to the Air Force in systems analysis to the Ford Corporation to the Defense Department. In all his life he's never known what it means to be a free man. An interesting comment at the time.

I was getting to -- all of this does relate to what I was saying about Kellman. Two aspects. As I say, Milgram seemed to reveal to me how those bombs got dropped over the seven years by people who didn't really believe in what they were doing. The seven years after Tet, namely, just what people do in these organizations. What they feel they ought to do. What they feel they have to do. I can even say it explained something to me -- this is in the early 70's that had puzzled me increasingly during my own trial. When I gave the Pentagon Papers, it was with the knowledge that I was doing something that there was no clear precedent for, but I did not have the sense that I differed in my attitude toward the war from almost anyone I knew. I could name exceptions, people who didn't quite agree with me about the war, but they weren't people with a lot of experience, on the whole. But

people who had been in Vietnam, people who had worked on it, they seemed to feel as strongly against the war as I did, and that still seems to be true. So I didn't explain to myself what I was doing by feeling differently. I thought of other reasons of what distinguished my behavior from theirs. But given that they all agreed with me, it did seem logical that now that they've had the example some of them would take the risks of doing the same. After all, it was very risky and the intent of putting me on trial for 115 years was to cool peoples' reflexes down and make them think twice before they did the same. But still, I was also in the Pentagon and I knew a lot of people who were very courageous, both physically and in some cases bureaucratically. And now that they had the idea what a useful thing this was to do, some of them would do it. And, of course, a few people did over the years. But like most people who do this, let's say the CIA guys who wrote memoirs about the CIA, and I've talked to them -- all of whom, again, felt that they shared the same attitudes as people in their agency and did expect other people to join them once they'd shown the idea. Each of us gets surprised by the absolute lack of followers. And the first reaction was, my first reaction, eventually, as time went on and people were not joining, was simply that they were simply careerist, cowardly, or terribly bureaucratic or something, but basically cowardly and careerist, given their actual attitudes. Milgram suggested to me, and I think this is true, actually, that -- it didn't explain my behavior, exactly -- but in terms of their behavior it showed that it was really very difficult for them to unlock themselves from this obedience, from this degree of conformity, to break that line between talking to the insiders and talking

to outsiders. To doing the absolutely forbidden, taboo thing, which is to tell the outside your criticisms and your opposition. The outside meaning Congress or the press and the public. And again, Milgram doesn't fully explain how this is, but he describes it as a phenomenon. When I read about people who were sweating, who were anxious, who really didn't want to hurt these people in the experiment, that's unmistakable, and yet did, clearly wasn't because they were afraid to be disobedient. And it wasn't because they didn't care. They did care. And yet something in them locked them in. They just weren't able to --

COMMENT: Conscience isn't a factor. I think that's what's interesting. People didn't finish the experiment and go "Oh, my God, I'm such a torturer. I'm a good person, and I wouldn't hurt somebody --"

DE: But this was the right thing to do. I was just wrong. I realized then that the degree of -- I don't want to make this too personal. I hadn't meant to get into this, but it's data. And the data is, I could say that I experienced over a matter of years a degree of isolation from these former friends that was hard for me to explain. It was puzzling. I wasn't expecting it. And from people, now, who agreed with me on the war, as I say. And I think, really, looking back on it, I can't test this because I really never have seen almost any of them again, that there was kind of an awed feeling that I had done something really bad, really bad, although they could agree with the results, with the effects.

COMMENT: What makes you say with such definiteness that people are not afraid?

DE: Oh, they also are afraid, of course. But in the case of the Milgram case, obviously.

COMMENT: Both in that case and in the case of your former friends --

DE: Well, do you think they were afraid?

COMMENT: Yes. I think that that's something that really was not addressed in the experiment.

DE: Tell me about that. In Milgram? How do you see it?

COMMENT: And I picture the same thing in the Caley situation.

DE: Obviously, in Caley they had reason to be.

COMMENT: Well, if I picture myself sitting in that situation, I walk into a room, a coin is tossed, I see somebody strapped into a chair who then screams and asks to be let out. It's a very thin line that prevents me from being strapped into the chair, and I'm in the room. I'm in this guy's turf. At some level I'm going to be thinking I'd better cooperate with him because if I don't I may end up over there.

DE: I can't rule that out. I must say I've never thought of that.

How does that strike --

COMMENT: Likewise with your former friends --

DE: Oh, no, in my case they did have strong career motives, very strong. No question about it.

COMMENT: And I would think first of all it was also that they could be murdered.

COMMENT: But what's to stop you from walking out of the room?

DE: In the Milgram case.

COMMENT: Well, I think what he's talking about maybe is not fear on the conscious level, but a more resonant fear. Like the man who said he laughed through the whole experiment, and he says, gee, that was really crazy. I guess I was laughing because I was so upset and nervous.

COMMENT: When you see -- I just picture myself. If you extrapolate it, if you read the accounts of the people who participated in the My Lai thing, like the guy who rounds everybody up and then waits for an hour, and then Caley comes back and says, well, when are you going to kill them? I can't imagine what I would do in that situation. But walking away would be very difficult to do. And it's a small step back from that into the Milgram thing, I think, because you see some-

body who comes in as a voluntary subject and before your eyes is transformed into a captive. I mean, there is something --

DE: But they agreed. They did have to agree to do that.

COMMENT: It's iffy, you know. I think that there is a real intimidating and threatening --

COMMENT: You're not talking about a rational level of thought.

COMMENT: Oh, no. No, no.

DE: I think that's an interesting perception.

COMMENT: Who here hasn't thought about since they have become active in the nuclear movement where back to you were going public to challenge government policy in a lot of ways, about what kind of retribution is going to come your way? I have all sorts of fantasies about it, some of which I think it's built in, of holding yourself above the system.

COMMENT: I was just listening to somebody who was talking last night about getting their tail light smashed in because of the bumper sticker on their car.

DE: Well, that's not unrealistic, these fears. I mean, they may be exaggerated. But the fact that there is some risk is not unrealistic.

And, of course, we can see in the Caley case, we can see in other cases, a very realistic fear if people don't do it. What is so startling about the Milgram results and what one must not turn away from is at least the possibility that you don't have to have such strong sanctions to keep people in this situation. You're implying, you're saying there may have been an element of sanction in their minds, at least some of them.

COMMENT: Well, I think it addresses your question earlier about how are we taught that we must obey authority, and I think that there is an implicit threat that we're conditioned very early.

COMMENT: I think this whole thing should be better understood from being stood on its head, that is, that you need to be taught, probably, to be disobedient.

DE: And one isn't.

COMMENT: Well, I was thinking when you asked the question, or maybe Steve, I guess, talked about his education as having a little bit of that. I went to a Quaker school where I was deliberately taught that there are times when one must be disobedient, and that that was a resonant theme all the way through my schooling, which I have a lot of respect for. You know, I wasn't taught to be part of a motorcycle gang, but I think that makes more sense to me. And there, I think also it's not a question of --

COMMENT: Conscience is the highest authority.

COMMENT: That's right. We're also not talking about being disobedient to authority, we're talking about a different authority, I think. It's not a personal authority. It's not a hierarchical authority, per se, but ultimately is, in my education and background, an internal authority which is the final arbiter.

DE: But when you say conscience is the authority, there is a question of what conscience tells you, or what conscience has been shaped to tell you.

COMMENT: Some of the people in the Milgram experiment didn't even consult it. It didn't occur to them that there was a consultation to be made.

DE: No, but at the same time they were certainly not feeling guilty. They were in good conscience. And he found that they could well have been in bad conscience -- in fact, people who did disobey were often people who felt uneasy afterwards about doing it. That's a subtle point in the book. He goes over it rather fast, but at some point in the book he mentions that in the later discussion, a number of the people who had broken off showed signs in their behavior or in what they said that they felt uneasy about their disobedience. They had to apologize for it. They had to justify it.

COMMENT: He actually says both things. That was one of my troubles

with it. He reports that that is the one thing that relieves the strain of wanting to disobey but not disobeying, is taking the act. And he said that's what people by and large felt themselves, the visible manifestations of strength disappeared when they actually disobeyed. And then later on he says, in the after discussions, those people then reported some conflict of conscience for having disobeyed.

DE: That's right.

COMMENT: I think there's a cultural conflict that goes on too. I think in the American culture there are two very dominant kinds of ideas about what people should do. One is that we should use the conscience as the highest authority, but the other is that we're a people of rules and laws, and that there are principles that are elevated and higher than any particular individual, and that those two things really contradict one another.

DE: What I meant to suggest a moment ago was Milgram ____, as I said, a decade ago that people were obeying their conscience. They were acting obediently in good conscience, and that what conscience told them was to obey the authority. What their conscience said was you are wrong. You should feel guilty and ashamed. You should feel uneasy if you are in a state of disobedience to constituted authority. And other people seem to defy -- you know, their priorities assigned by their conscience are somewhat different. They don't define secular authority as the last word. And notice that Milgram does say -- he wasn't able to generalize too well about the people who did disobey in

what he found. But one thing he did note was that people who had a strong religious training, though one might associate that with a training from authoritarian cast of mind, did tend -- or at least those who disobeyed -- you couldn't say that people who had a religious training would disobey -- but those who disobeyed were disproportionately people who did have a strong religious training, and who would say to themselves, God's law is not necessarily man's law, and I don't have to --

COMMENT: Two authorities were in conflict.

DE: To have a strong sense of God as an authority and as something distinct from earthly authority is already to dilute inevitably the strength of any given secular authority. He's not all there is. There is somebody else to consult.

COMMENT: Except there's a contradiction there, because in the biblical history, I think he refers in here to God giving Abraham the order to sacrifice his son. And that was a virtue. And that made me think about Genesis where God tells Eve not to take the apple. And Eve disobeys and she --

COMMENT: The first disobedience.

COMMENT: Boy, did she pay.

COMMENT: We all have.

DE: Yeah, get the message.

COMMENT: But the message there is that if you obey that higher authority, which is God, then you're obedient.

DE: Yeah. Well, and the sin. What is original sin? Disobedience, isn't that the definition of it?

COMMENT: That's the original sin.

DE: Somebody else?

COMMENT: Well, I was going to say I thought one point that Milgram makes that what happens to your conscience in these situations and may explain part of why people don't take risks, is that the overplay is that they really are trying to please and get positive feedback from the person in authority, and the desire to please and to perform well and your interest in how well you're performing takes over. And that's part of why people don't step out of line. They're afraid of being unpopular.

COMMENT: So instead of saying why aren't we taught to be -- are we really taught to be obedient? The question, I think, might have something more to do with what's the payoff? If people actually _____ some very positive rewards for themselves by affording themselves the opportunity to be close to the source of magical power, the people

attribute some kind of immortality or magical omnipotence to the authority figure. It's not that they were taught to obey, it's that there's sort of an automatic sharing of that power. And you can be kicked out of the Garden of Eden simply by challenging that authority. There's something positive, not just the absence of --

DE: Uh-huh. Well, to move to one other part of this, then, I just want to say. On the one hand, this seemed to be related to the general phenomenon of his -- the bombing, which was problematic if one knew how many of the people doing the bombing felt that it was poor public policy, and yet continued to do it. So Milgram says, "Well, this is the way people behave. This is the way you should expect people to behave. This is not remarkable behavior. This is the way they behave in organizations."

But he didn't answer the question of what about the people who give the orders? How did they bring themselves, what is their attitude?

COMMENT: You had mentioned that last time. I think your McNamara example ... addresses that.

DE: Of course, he had a boss.

COMMENT: ... run for President of this country. You and I would make a terrible ticket. Really. Because there is something about people who, as Kellman says, are integrated into the system in a normative way that allows them to attain the kind of positions in structures

that allow them to move on in the system. That there is something that happens with people who move to a higher conscience ... organization that seems to leave them out of the system.

DE: That they get weeded out, you mean.

COMMENT: Yes. In other words, my thought is, most of our government -- our government selects type those who would deny responsibility.

DE: Yeah, that's certainly true. As I say, when a guy did finally go to the point of showing attitudes so strong in contradicting the President on his policy as to suggest to the President that he might even go further and break ranks, eventually, he's quickly weeded. That is an example of the institutional process that assures that you get these types at the top. In other words, they're not likely to get near the top. And if they get near the top and they're noticed, they're pulled out, eventually. Ball also left, of course. And both left without taking any documents or ever revealing anything. Of course, remember that these documents were very much to their credit. Ball had these memos as early as '64 and '65 predicting 500,000 troops in Vietnam, predicting that the escalation would go on and on, that it would achieve nothing. Marvelous memos. Years passed and he's never released this stuff, and he's been outside.

After the Pentagon Papers came out, giving parts of his memos, he then proudly published, he revealed his memo, his full memo, which we've never had, in the Atlantic.

COMMENT: Ball did that?

DE: Ball did that. After the Pentagon Papers come out --

COMMENT: Right after?

DE: Soon. Same year. And in fact, the Defense Department initiated -- it's now under Nixon -- initiated proceedings against him for a trial. Interesting little footnote. He had now published this top secret memo of his. So there's a guy who wrote a memoir about his security -- he was a security officer in the Pentagon. And so one of his cases was Ball's case. He was supposed to work up a case for Ball for breaking security. And, of course, he reports in his memos -- which never got published; I saw the manuscript -- of course, the Justice Department then pointed out that it was not illegal what he had done. He had put out a top secret memo, which was not illegal. That's true. I had not, in fact, broken the law. So they didn't prosecute him since he hadn't broken any law. They wanted to. Mine was an experimental prosecution, see if you can put me in jail without my having broken the law. But they didn't try it on Ball.

So McNamara, meanwhile, as I say, had tried hard to keep a lid on the bombing, come to the conclusion that it was totally unjustified. This was by the fall of '67. He leaves in March '68. Seven years passed, during which four times as many bombs are dropped as he dropped. Not one word out of him during this period. And my opinion of him, which had been high, really, at that point, knowing how hard he'd worked to reverse his own error. He felt responsible for having

started the bombing, properly. He felt it was incumbent on him to try to get it down now that he realized it wasn't working. But when he left the building, he no longer seemed to feel any personal responsibility for doing this. Again, this is my confidence I'm breaking, and what not, I called him up once, years later. I was on trial, and he had told my lawyers that -- they had asked him if he would be an expert witness to testify as to whether these documents had hurt national security, which he knew as well as anybody they had not. And he not only refused to do that, but said "if you put me on the stand" -- we could have subpoenaed him -- he said "I will guarantee I will hurt your defense," meaning he would testify against what he knew to be true, punish us by saying "oh, these hurt national security terribly." He didn't want to be on the stand.

However, when Haiphong was being mined -- and I had written the first study for him of the idea of mining Haiphong, which he was then in favor of, in 1965, and I did a very highly classified study on the effects of mining Haiphong with a lot of mostly Navy experts who did it, which I supervised, the result of which was that it would have no useful military effect. And this convinced him not to do it. He dropped mining Haiphong. So in 1972, Haiphong was in the process of being mined. And what was more important, as I knew, that was being used essentially as a cover and a distraction from the real military operation which was going on, which was returning to full scale bombing of North Vietnam, which had been dropped in late '68. With all attention being on the mining of Haiphong, but in fact the B52's were now flying all over Vietnam, and very heavy bombing, and they were bombing Haiphong. And it was clear that they would eventually bomb

Hanoi, as they did. So that massacre was now in process in North Vietnam. But the cover of that was the Haiphong mining, and the theory that the Haiphong mining would end the war because it would stop the supplies from North Vietnam. Now the Joint Chiefs had consistently favored the mining of Haiphong, saying that that's where most of the material was coming in, which was true, the heavy material like surface to air missiles and cement, things that required ship transport. But the CIA and the office of Secretary of Defense and State Department had said repeatedly yes, it's coming in by Haiphong, but there's plenty of river transport from China. So much so they could bring a hundred times more of this stuff in on river, canals and rivers, from China. And roads, for that matter, as well. So you can't possibly stop the transport by hitting Haiphong. The Joint Chiefs' answer to that, by the way, was "That's hypothetical. You say that they'll shift over to transporting it through China, but we don't know that. And meanwhile, it's coming in through Haiphong. So we say you should hit Haiphong." And this argument went on, in effect, for years. The upshot, by the way, was when they hit Haiphong that the transport was all shifted to China, and it did not, in fact, have any effect on the transport of material down through North Vietnam.

But I wanted, if possible, to remove that cover for what they were doing in North Vietnam by exposing the thing. And I had two methods of that. One was a set of documents that had been done under Nixon, which I now released at this time. I had been on trial for a year at this point, in '72, that is in a court, but we released these documents showing that the CIA and office of Secretary of Defense and State Department had all said that mining Haiphong would have no

useful military effect. National Security Study Memorandum No. 1. I've just put this aside, but since I'm giving this much history, let me give you this footnote on history. The White House five days before the mining of Haiphong, May 3rd, 1972, knowing that I was trying to get these materials out through Gravelle, Senator Gravelle, who tried to put them in the Congressional record -- so the White House knew, now, that I was -- and he was blocked, by Goldwater and others, from putting them in the Congressional record. But they now knew I was now getting ready to release the _____ 1, which they knew I'd had all this time and hadn't yet released. So they brought 11 guys up from Miami to incapacitate me totally on May 3rd -- this may bear to our general subject. May 3rd, 1972. I see a way to make it fit, which is, they had come up then to kill me, according to the prosecutor, William Marrow, but anyway, the words they used were to incapacitate me totally. And when I learned that that had been the motive, I knew exactly who must have ordered that and why, at that point, and Sy Hirsch confirmed this in his book. He found out -- he got people in the White House and people who worked for Haig who said, yes, they were concerned that I was putting out missome (?) 1, at that point. And they had to shut me up then. They tried to blackmail me, tried to bug me, burgle me, they had me on trial, and so forth. But to shut me up right then was necessary because five days later the President was to do something which was to be presented as a response to an offensive by the North Vietnamese with every reason to believe that it would have a strong military effect in ending the war, and so forth. And that was not the time they wanted me to put out documentary evidence that this had been under strong consideration from the first

month of Nixon's administration, when is when I worked for him on it, and that he had then been told as early as that that this would not have any useful military effect. They didn't want that out before the mining took place.

I didn't know, of course, that these people had come up to kill me because they didn't carry it out. I didn't know about it until later. I do know that that Sunday, a few days later, was the blackest day of my life, because for two years I had been trying to stop this. This is why I put out the Pentagon Papers, basically, in '69, because I knew the mining of Haiphong was coming and that that would be used as a cover for all-out carpet bombing of Vietnam, with no useful military effect. Nothing but massacre. This is what I tried to prevent. It was clear to me that I had not prevented it. And I remember the headlines on Sunday. One story was by Reston. The lead of it was "Nobody knows what he will do." And Frankl, Max Frankl, had a story, the headline of which was to the same effect. "Only the President knows, somehow, what he's going to do about this." And I remember holding those up to a press conference the next day. The NFC was then meeting. Publicly that was known. And I said, "I think I know what he is doing. He is telling the NFC at this moment that he's mining Haiphong." This is what I had been saying, this is what they wanted me to be quiet about.

A few weeks later, then, I called McNamara. I hadn't talked to him since '67. And at that time he had told me that -- I had a proposal then for the elections in Vietnam and negotiations and what not. He said he couldn't work on that. He agreed with me, but he couldn't work on that. He was spending all his effort to keep the

bombing down, which is why he got fired a few months later. I hadn't seen him since then. So, I called him up and I said, "I'm not going to talk to you about my trial or the Pentagon Papers or anything. I want to talk to you about the mining of Haiphong. I know that you have always known this to be unwise, that you've been against this since '65." He said "That's right." And I said "And you know and I know that you know that you have this study, not only by me but others, later -- and that you know that what the President is saying, that he's going to end the war with this, is not true." He said, "That's right." And I said, "So, I think that it would be very powerful if you were now publicly to say 'I have studied this in my capacity of Secretary of Defense. I have seen the classified data on this. And it is my judgement that this cannot have a useful military effect and it will not serve the purposes of ending the war.'" He said, "Well, Dan, I'm an international civil servant, and I've really decided that I cannot speak out on any policy issue like that." I said, "Well, Mr. McNamara, I know you've taken that" -- obviously there's a lot of spin on this conversation which I'm not conveying, of course. Here was a guy I'd been very close to, in some ways, hadn't spoken to for five years, and who most recently -- and who, by the way, in another book, had cried in telling Lyndon Johnson that it was not his fault the Pentagon Papers had come out. He was not responsible for this betrayal of Lyndon Johnson. So I was saying all this. No, we both knew all this background. And so I said, after a pause, "Mr. McNamara, now I'm going to say this very seriously, and obviously I don't make this proposal in any way casually. But it seems to me in this situation that if you feel you cannot speak out because of your

status as President of the World Bank, this is the time you should seriously consider resigning, so that you will be free to discuss this subject." And there was a slight silence. And then he just said, "Well, Dan, I made that decision quite a while ago, and I'm going to stick by it. I'm not going to speak out." And he managed not to. And he didn't, as the war got bigger, and his wife got an ulcer, and his son had disowned him and hadn't spoken to him for years. I don't know whether they ever got reconciled or not.

COMMENT: What reason did he give?

DE: That he's an international civil servant. He couldn't speak out. He had no choice, as Kellman's people would say. He wasn't about to be disloyal to Lyndon Johnson. He wasn't going to go against the President. He didn't say any of these things. All he said was, "I can't. I'm president of the World Bank." By the way, at a time when -- I can't judge it. I've asked other people with better judgement. It's extremely questionable that he would have hurt himself with the world community, all of which was opposing what we were doing. The entire world. And of course the World Bank and its operations were being crippled, basically, by the United States' preoccupation and the political implications of our whole involvement in Vietnam. He could only have improved his stature in the world community.

COMMENT: Do you think you have any idea what increments of whatever it might have taken that would have allowed him to say I'll consider it and then do it? The question I'm curious about is when can people

be disobedient in that way? What could have been added to McNamara in that circumstance, let's say --

DE: Well, you see, if it had been a rather clearcut feeling of loyalty or specifically, as Lyndon Johnson guessed, he expected McNamara to be disloyal to him on one circumstance, a competing loyalty. He felt his loyalty to the Kennedy family, to his previous President, to the President who hired him, not Johnson. His sense, by the way, all these people share, of the President who hired me, who put me in the play, who gave me this status, who gave me this sense of contribution, of courage, who asked this of me, who allowed me to discover the heights I was able to rise to in this situation of power, and the heights of loyalty, etc. etc., who gave me all these psychological satisfactions. He owns me. I once -- the last time I saw Henry Kissinger at a meeting, given all this obedience stuff and all this, you'll be interested in the name of the meeting. MIT students had put together an operation where they brought their fathers' generation, corporate executives and various officials, to talk about ending the bombing of Vietnam. This was in 1971, January. I was at MIT then. And they called it Runnymede. You know, where the Magna Carta was signed, where the King was brought by the Barons. And they brought Henry Kissinger. And they had on our side -- I was sitting next to Cy Vance, at that point, and various people who were then critical of the war. And I got one of the students -- I had a question I wanted to ask Kissinger, and I knew I'd only get one shot at him. I had one other question I wanted to ask, so I gave it to another guy. And the question was, "Under what circumstances would you resign your position

and denounce the President's policy?" And Kissinger's answer to this very elite group -- as I say, there were a lot of people like Vance in the room -- was "If you are given this responsibility, if you are entrusted with this responsibility by a President, there are no circumstances under which I would criticize the President publicly." That was what was expected to be the right answer to this elite group. No circumstances. But the guide, Derek Scherer, pressed the point, "But resign? Are there any circumstances?" He said, "Well, if something truly immoral was done." "Like what?" And he said, "Like gas chambers."

Now, interestingly, I had heard him give a similar answer to that before. And I said something, which Derek thought was very damning, a very great charge, I said, "Because Henry Kissinger believes that there is one state war crime that was committed in history. It was done by Germans to Jews." And he's not alone in that. I mean, a lot of people in the audience, including Derek, couldn't well see what was happening right then was that gas chambers, or jellied gasoline, was being brought to victims at that very time. Delivered to their doorstep. Civilians were being slaughtered in enormous numbers. As a matter of fact, one's aspect of the context, the theme that he had come from Washington to tell us at MIT was this: He says, speaking of several of the other critics, "Why are you questioning me as if we are expanding the war?" He says, "The war is winding down, and it will continue to wind down. I assure you of that." That was the message that he came to give. And that was the general understanding of everyone. He left, and the conference went on for another day and a half.

Osborne Elliot, Editor in Chief of Newsweek, was another member of the audience. He was in a working group I was in the next day. And I was saying what I thought the real strategy was, which was not winding down the war. And Elliott left at a break, in a break in the mid morning. He came back and he said, "Ellsberg, there may be something in what you say. Just now I got the word from my office that there is a total blackout of news from Saigon. Total blackout."

Remember, by the way, the little blackout we had over Granada. It occurs to me not quite unprecedented. Because the fact is there was about a four day blackout starting the morning after Kissinger saw us. It later turned out that that night that Kissinger had taken the trouble to tell these elite people that the war is winding down and will continue to wind down, there will be no expansion, was the night the pre-invasion bombing of Laos had started. And the blackout reflected the fact that we were in the process with our Vietnamese proxies of invading Laos, starting the next day.

But in terms of what would be wrong, everybody has it in their heads there was one thing wrong. Six million Jews. And we forget about the five to six million non-Jews who were exterminated in the same camps. It's interesting, nobody bothers to inflate that figure to its real size. Eleven million people were exterminated in the extermination process, not six million, it so happened, which is symptomatic in itself, I suppose, of something. But that was done -- people understand that was uncanny, eerie, and what not, and indeed, Zionists, Ely Visel and many others have emphasized the inscrutability of that occurrence that it must be seen as unique, as something you can't learn from, something that has no roots other than in antisemit-

ism in past behavior. Nothing is to be compared with it, because to compare anything with it is to denigrate it, diminish its significance, and what not.

Obviously, what Milgram believed by his constant association of the Nazis and Vietnam, what many others have seen, is this sense that the behavior is not quite limited to that one, and that there is something to be understood here. There's a more general phenomenon. Something that must be understood because Jews are not the only potential victims in the world. That's another point of view, which I share.

So we get to the question of how people can obey this. But we are left still with the question "what about the higher level people?" And Kellman now deals with two higher level types. Briefly, for those of you who haven't read it, or to remind you, his conjecture about the lower level people is that they feel powerless and that they feel that they've made a contract basically with the state: "We'll do anything you ask without question, we won't give you any trouble, you take all the responsibility for what is done."

[Tape 2, Side 1]

DE: ... potential for very destructive behavior, and if you look in the book you'll see this several times, given malevolent authority. And a number of times he talks about, then, the vulnerability that obedience creates to a Hitler, to an evil person at the top, to somebody who has malevolent aims. Now, that is, in a way, that's a conjecture about the nature of leaders who give these -- you know, where the danger lies. People who give this kind of order.

The implication of Kellman's paper is, by the way, that the leader doesn't have to be that much different from the followers, in values or anything else. Kellman's -- I'd have to call it a conjecture. I don't think he has a lot of data for this. But to me, he at least does address directly the question that Milgram doesn't, and that is, what is the psychology of the people who give the orders? Orders, now, to do things that are "normally" regarded as evil, as totally unjustifiable. Orders, let's say, for the massacre of women and children. Kellman says that the guy at the top, by identifying with the organization, regarding himself abstractly as a servant of the cause, a servant of the movement, a servant of the organization, conceptualizes himself much as do the subordinates, and has the same characteristic of feeling nonresponsible, feeling that he had no choice, feeling that the circumstances of the situation, given the aims and the needs of the organization, left him with no choice but to do what was best for the cause, and that was a uniquely defined thing, and he did it. He didn't have any choice. Having figured out what needed to be done, he did it. He didn't have any choice not to do that because it's what the organization needed.

You have to put one further thing in there -- and this is relatively explicit, as a general rule -- and that is, that the state, in particular, is not subject to the moral constraints that individuals are thought to be subject to in their private life. Reinhold Niebuhr makes this as one of his themes very much, that it is foolish, unrealistic, naive, and leads you astray to imagine that states can afford to feel bound by the same kind of constraints that we ask of people acting face to face, in personal relations in the community, specifically, obviously, with respect to killing. The state carries out capital punishment, has a monopoly of this. The state has armed forces, may have to undertake war. But it goes beyond that. There are really no constraints or written constraints to what the state may have to do for interests of state or at least for national security.

Let me suggest this as a very simple model of how massacre gets legitimated and done, if you think of the Milgram and Kelman together. Rule 1: There are no constraints on obedience to constituted authority. You're not taught and you are not encouraged to believe that there are lines you must not cross in obeying authority. I've been asked, I suppose, about several thousand times in public and on the air: Where would you draw the line? Meaning, where would you draw the line at disobedience? What secrets would you not tell? That's what I'm asked incessantly. I'm never asked, and the question never arises, and I guess I should be asking: Where would you draw the line at obedience? What secrets would you feel compelled to tell? What secrets should you not keep? Where should you not obey? That's the thing raised by the Caley thing.

The Nuremberg principles, which the U.S. in particular espoused,

of course say there are natural laws, there are higher laws, there are international laws that are quite explicit, which are the highest law of the land. They prohibit massacre specifically. And orders to carry out such a massacre are ipso facto illegal. You not only are not obliged to obey them, you do not have a right to obey them, you are punishable if you obey them, it is your duty to resist. Those are the Nuremberg principles. That's one Nuremberg principle. There's another one I'll come to in a moment.

It's clear from the answers to Kellman's survey that Americans, most Americans, do not agree with that principle. They not only don't live with it, by it; they don't believe in it. The Nuremberg principle, of course, says -- was deliberately framed against the German defense 'we were obeying orders.' That was the key Nuremberg defense. Nearly every defendant used it, except Schper (?), who plead guilty, and one or two others. This is saying the Germans were right, they were not responsible. And consistently with that, and would you not agree this was one of the more surprising results of the Kellman -- I don't know if it was in the article I gave you, but it was in one of these articles. They were actually asked do you agree that German officers should have been punished at Nuremberg? And most Americans said no, they should not have been, which is rather surprising. And, of course, of people in particular who said that Caley should not have been tried, the great majority of them said the Germans should not have been tried. So they were consistent in that, and again, that was a surprise for me. They just don't believe in that Nuremberg principle. First point. Obey orders. First rule.

The second rule is, the state is not subject to any absolute

constraints. There are no absolute prohibitions, regardless of circumstances, for the state. And that means for the state's representatives under orders up to the top, and that's the key. Anyone feeling that he represents the state, either because he's obeying higher officers or because he is the highest officer of the state, and thus speaks for the state, is in that capacity not subject to any absolute prohibitions, any absolute constraints.

COMMENT: This is what's called [bind ?]

DE: Well, no. How so?

COMMENT: Well, either there is a higher international law or there isn't.

DE: Oh. This denies that there is international law. It's not a bind. No, I'm sorry. I'm saying this is the operational rule. Let me suggest that this is the operational rule that guides American -- and not only American -- citizens and officials in their interpretations. International law is a scherade, doesn't amount to anything. The state cannot afford to abide by international law. We are now just seeing this -- well, I just say the word Granada. A hundred and eight nations in the world, including some of our allies, found it necessary to say that the United States had violated international law. The fact that 108 nations would say that gives the lie to the statement there is no such thing as international law. I heard the lawyer say that. It's a common practical lawyer's attitude,

'there really isn't any international law.' And I said, can you really say that it's meaningless that people who are dependent on us and want to be our allies could not bring themselves to support us in this interpretation of international law? That vote was without significance, to be sure. It was on page 21 of the New York Times, which is not where the slightly lower vote against Russia on Afghanistan found its place in the New York Times. That was page one, big banner. When we got a higher vote against us it was the bottom of page 21. Nevertheless, it was in there, and it shows that there is something to international law.

But the American people are not, you know, ready to impeach the President because he just committed an impeachable offense. A hundred and eight nations in the world, and they are right, just said the President of the United States just committed an impeachable offense. Not a minor impeachable offense. He just violated his oath to obey the law, starting with the highest law of the land, including the U.N. Charter, the treaties which form the highest law of the land. He is impeachable for that. Seven people have started impeachment proceedings for this.

COMMENT: And are called clowns in Washington.

DE: And they aren't going to get very far, although they're right. So the second point, then, very simply is: The state can do anything. And that means the highest official of the state in that capacity can do anything. That means, if you put the two principles together, he can get anything done. He can get it obeyed. He not only is free to

choose any particular line of policy, but he can get it carried out. I'm saying by Americans. He doesn't have to have Germans to do it. The Americans will obey principle one enough, enough like the Germans they will do it if he says it. And he, Democrat or Republican -- I conjecture here, now, on my second principle -- will feel that he has a right to do anything.

But now let me put one more fact into this, and it's implicit in a lot of what I've been saying so far. This is where we draw together a good deal of it, all my anecdotal material. Neither Kellman nor Milgram actually does go into this. When we talk about massacre, we're talking, as Kellman points out, about something that is generally regarded as being unjustifiable under any circumstances whatever, understood to happen in the heat of battle at a low level, and so forth. But it is not an American impression that massacre is justifiable under any circumstances, by anybody, right? When people say the state can do anything, they do not hear that in their minds as equivalent to a collection of concrete statements of this form, which include the statement, 'and the President can order a massacre, if he wants.' That's not what they have in mind. In other words, in signing what amounts to a blank check as to what the state is allowed to do, and I think that is fairly conscious, the proposition that the state under extraordinary circumstances, in some circumstances of national security and whatever, has to do what needs to be done, whatever that is. But the public is not led to be very conscious of what that might encompass in the mind of a President. If they thought it meant massacre, they might think twice about the general principle, and even about the earlier principle, it is your duty to obey, what-

ever you were ordered. I'm asserting as an empirical thing that Americans don't have it in their heads entirely, when they assent to that, what it is they may be ordered, or certain things that may be ordered.

Let me say what I now know --and I didn't know all of these when I was in; I knew some of them -- that Presidents do feel they have a right to plan, to consider as options, and have carried out quite consciously, sometimes through proxies, assassination in virtually every term of office by every President, the threat of initiating nuclear war on at least a local level, widespread deliberate massacres of all kinds, in particular from the air by strategic bombing. But also, though essentially through proxies, by knives and bullets and dashing peoples' heads against the wall, the classic forms of massacre, which have been done as American-planned projects in, for example, Indonesia, where something between 500,000 and 2,000,000 people were killed, mostly without bullets. Their heads were beaten in, or especially the children, so as to save bullets, by our Indonesian allies, who were, by uncontradicted testimony of a CIA agent named Ralph McGehee, had to be urged strongly and pressed and pressured over a period of time by our government to carry out this project of the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party and everybody associated with it. Some massacres, by the way, are relatively random, and some are just as incidental to the winning of a war. Bombing, in general, has that character. And some people draw a distinction between that and Hitler's genocide, which was deliberately exterminative. The destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party was an American government policy, which was exterminative. It was the decision of the most

top officials of America that that large number of people should cease to exist. They should no longer be a factor in the politics of Indonesia. And they were killed. And a whole lot of other people were killed too because in such a process grudges are settled and there's a lot of mistakes that are made.

COMMENT: When was that, Dan?

DE: That was in 1965, late '65, early '66. About a year, starting in about October '65.

COMMENT: The CIA agent you referred to, Ralph McGehee?

DE: Ralph McGehee. Yes, Ralph McGehee asserted this in some detail in an article in The Nation about a year and a half ago, and he cleared that article through CIA, who forced him to delete about five phrases. So the article is printed in a very unusual form for America, with five blank spaces in it from prior censorship by the government. They did not delete his assertion that it had been CIA policy to provide computer lists of the people to be killed, and that they had urged and had to force the generals to carry out this massacre. That was cleared by CIA, about a year and a half --

COMMENT: This is what you call your local

DE: Yeah, right. Now, what I'm just saying to you, of course, was a secret until McGehee revealed it. What makes these particular kinds

of massacres -- oh, another aspect: torture, on a wide scale, by proxy government. By governments that we want to torture, who carry out the torture with our knowledge -- that was what drove my friend Tony Russo into rebellion, actually. He visited a lot of prisoner war camps and he became very aware of how much we not only tolerated but encouraged the almost universal torture of Vietnamese by Arvin (?), not by U.S. Later it turned out U.S. people did it also. That led one colonel into revolt, Herbert. Herbert quit. One of the two most decorated officers in Vietnam quit because they ignored his protests against deliberate torture of prisoners. Again, in many cases, by U.S. policy. Our role in the Pinochet, the overthrow of Allende, of course, leading to a massive torture regime. Our current relation to the government of El Salvador.

One characteristic that all these operations have in common is secrecy, extreme secrecy about the U.S. governmental role and above all the Presidential role. I'll give you an empirical thing that fits into this abstract model. One of the major demands for obedience made by our government since the end of the second World War is the demand for secrecy. Initially something almost absent from our government. The Manhattan Project was almost the introduction of American civilians to a formal secrecy system with clearances, classification stamps and whatnot. For example, the State Department did not have that prior to the second World War. Even the State Department. It was purely a military matter to have clearances, code names, stamps, and all that. The Manhattan Project really introduced physicists and other civilians to that. Under Truman it was extended to the whole civilian part of the government dealing with national security. That

was new. A formal secrecy system of this -- so among the orders you had to obey, starting with the Cold War, was a demand for secrecy. You must keep your mouth shut.

There is something unusual about that promise. I was very widely regarded above all. The main stigma that I had to live with was that I had supposedly broken a promise to keep secrets. And, of course, I had promised to keep secrets. And I had broken that promise. That was the meaning of disloyalty, treason, this and that. I wasn't seen as having given anything to the Russians, nor was I accused of that, or to any foreigners. And yet the word treason and betrayal and disloyalty and all was very freely used. And when probed, turned out to mean just this, you know, I had been disloyal to the team, to the government, I'd broken my promise.

Now, of course, the promise was made some years earlier, and one might have said new circumstances had arisen, and so forth. But it lead me to reflect on this fact. A promise to keep secrets made as a condition of receiving those secrets has an unusual status as a promise. You don't know exactly what you're promising to keep. When you say "I will not tell what I learn," it's an unusual situation where if you were asked then by an interrogator "Now, what is it you promised not to tell," you don't know the nature of the situation. You have signed a blank check in that respect.

COMMENT: Did that ever cross your mind?

DE: It never crosses anyone's mind when they sign it.

COMMENT: No, I mean later, when you were publicly ...

DE: Well, it was very obvious to me, you see, by that time that when I had made those promises earlier I had, in fact, not dreamed of what it was I would be asked to keep secret. Clear cut, deliberate violations of international law. And remember, the Pentagon by this time, in these days, is filled with people who understand that what they just did in Granada is a violation of international law, if that matters. But one could say more significantly than that deliberate massacres, coups, assassinations, this and that. Somebody signing that promise has no reason to have -- certainly ten years ago, now there are more revelations, of course. But ten or fifteen years ago, there was no reason to imagine that the secrets you would be asked to keep were secrets that must be kept secrets from the American public because they were criminal, because they involved lies, because they involved massacres. One didn't have a sense that the American public government did that. Nor would a high official. Nor would a President, until he became President, have learned from the Senate or as a governor, or whatever he was before that, what it was the U.S. President really did in the world. The scene of the early briefing -- Truman learns about the Manhattan Project the day he takes office, and the plans to destroy Hiroshima, in effect, and so forth. Other people learned. Lyndon Johnson is briefed on the assassination plots against Castro, and so forth. It's very like the scene in the Godfather, I guess, or such a scene, where the young scion, you know, the heir to the patriarchy finally comes of age, is brought into the study, and told "Now we're going to tell you what the family business really is.

Here's how it's done" or "what sent you through college, where the money came from."

COMMENT: Who would kill the President?

DE: Oh, he gets a series of briefings.

COMMENT: Who would kill him if he spoke out?

DE: Who would kill the President? Oh, well, there's a lot of killers.

COMMENT: I don't know that that has anything to do with this, but it seems to me a slight -- like Sadat, somebody with courage --

DE: Does he worry about getting killed, are you saying? Well, put it this way. Teddy Kennedy is very open about family worries that he would be killed if he ran for President. Do you think Teddy Kennedy doesn't worry about that he could get killed if he were President? His brother was killed.

COMMENT: I'm saying specifically, that is, Sadat is the only person I think of, I have limited knowledge, who clearly went internally to say I want to do something different. And he made it different. No doubt a President could make a tremendous difference, one of which the letters would come from exposing this information that would galvanize public feeling. Who could not tolerate that? Who would bump him off if he rose, if the President went to an internal morality?

DE: Well, certainly there are killers in the country who are on government payroll and who take their orders. And they don't get their orders from the President, directly. And are they people who can imagine the President getting out of line, just like one of their colleagues? Yes? That's something to chew on.

I'm getting over time.

COMMENT: How do you know about the killers on government payroll?

DE: They're described in some detail, among other things, in the Church Committee reports, which was quite a revelation to me, and which came out fairly late in the game. I didn't read that until I think about '77, and I learned a lot from it.

COMMENT: Was this the gentleman that came to visit you that Sunday?

DE: What?

COMMENT: Are these the gentlemen that came up from Florida to visit you that Sunday?

COMMENT: From Miami.

DE: Well, yes. In fact, two of them were rather famous for this. One of the guys who came up was a guy named Frank Sturgiss (?) who had tried to assassinate Castro unsuccessfully. Luckily they put this team onto me. All the people they assigned to me had been people who

had tried to overthrow Castro, so I was blessed in my attackers. And Sturgiss was at that very moment involved in a plot to kill the guy in Panama, Torrios (?), which was apparently aborted by their being caught in Watergate.

But some of these people are described in detail in the volume, in the Church Committee, on alleged assassination reports, efforts. And one of them called, I think, code name W. Y. Rogue, is described -- very interesting terms. I should have brought the exact quote with me, but I remember it pretty closely -- in a government, his fitness report by his officer. He was sent to kill Lumumba, among other things. He said he will do anything. Not because he has no conscience, or moral standards, but because his moral standards will assure him that anything his superiors ask him to do is legitimate. This was a comment on him on his government file. And see, the interesting thing is, the implication of Kellman is, that's not an unusual person in the bureaucracy. That pretty much describes American society, to a very large extent. But -- let me bring this to an end for a minute, sum it up a little bit. I don't think it's the case that everybody will accept this stuff, condone it, keep the secrets, or do it. How, then, does it get done with so little friction?

And the answer is the secrecy system is a crucial part of that process. You get people, you train them, you socialize them, you select them, for their adherence to these two quite general rules. Will you do what you're told by constituted authority, and do you sort of agree that there are no total prohibitions, the state can do what it has to do. Not hard to find people who will agree to those. Great majority. But a lot of those would have second thoughts to the point

of resistance, certainly of resigning, if they knew exactly what they were signing, what the State was doing. How does it get it done? And the answer is, by lying to the public about what it does do, and keeping those lies effective by an effective secrecy system. It is an extreme secret that the United States government was responsible for the massacre in Indonesia which everyone of that period knows took place. It is not in the consciousness of most Americans that we are fully responsible in intent and in a critical role with the overthrow of Allende and the destruction of democracy in Chile. Or, likewise, in Guatemala, going back to Arben's overthrow in 1954. Or our role in Brazil in bringing in the coup against a democratically elected left liberal, Goulart (?), in 1964, and the later terror squads.

People who work in the government, of course, become aware of one or another of these things, but again, secrecy is used enormously to keep from generalizing from that and realizing how widespread that is.

Having said that, one last anecdote occurs to me. I happened to be in the office of John McNaughton, for whom I didn't yet work, former law professor at Harvard. Later that summer I worked for him. But I already had access to the cables, I was working on NATO speeches for McNamara at that point as a consultant. So I happened to note, see the cables on that particular day, in an area that I didn't usually look at, Brazil, and became aware that Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, of Harvard, Ambassador then, was fully aware and was essentially coordinating naval movements and whatnot for the support of the generals who were overthrowing democracy in Brazil, because Goulart was in the process of nationalizing oil, and that is a sure ticket out of office in the free world. Well, this is a theory of where the

freedom stops. I had read those cables, too, and he was reading the cables in there, and he came out of the office and was just passing me by, and he said this, he said, "You know, Dan, can it be that the foreign policy of the United States is nothing but counterrevolution?"

COMMENT: He's getting warm.

DE: Well, he paused. It was a very serious comment. Then he said, "If I believed that, I couldn't be sitting where I'm sitting. I couldn't be sitting in this ____." And then he went off down the hall. And it was later that I went to work for him on Vietnam.

But how could he not know that? And the answer is, because the secrecy system prevented him from knowing about Guatemala in '54, knowing about -- I'm sure he didn't know about Indonesia that was happening, that's much too highly controlled, even though that was at that time. He didn't know anything he didn't need to know. And he didn't need to know anything that would lead him to question this general framework of obedience and the acceptability of it.

So I think the President knows what has to be kept secret. He knows he can get these jobs done, and therefore it's his obligation to use these approaches, if they're needed. But he also knows which of them have to be kept highly secret. And which have to be lied about, how those lies have to be manipulative. And the ability to lie to that degree is critical. At least, I think it's critical. I hope it's critical. I take hope in the fact that the President thinks it's critical. Because if it's critical, then the possibility of informing the public and creating a different consciousness about what the

government is up to creates the possibility of disobedience. That's what the President fears. I think he's right to fear that. And I hope he's right to fear that, because it does allow the possibility that these things can evoke disobedience.

COMMENT: I might suggest just a couple quick, I realize it's late, but very quick pieces of the Milgram issue which I think haven't been tended here tonight, and I think are within the social science, they're both very severe issues. One is that the experiment presents the actor who is playing victim as the victim. It calls him the victim. The real victim is the naive subject who is being subjected by the actor who acts victim and the actor who acts instructor, who is being subjected to severe moral and conscience anguish in a very weird situation where Milgram, who thinks he's studying how people respond irrationally to authority, is in fact the authority who has set the whole damn thing in motion and who is urging the two actors to collude with him in causing pain to this other person. Now one of the odd things about the Milgram study is that where someone seems to be engaging in physical pain but isn't, that's considered somehow -- that's suffering. When you've got the person who is inflicting the pain or thinks he is, or she is, and is going through all this torment and crying sometimes herself or himself, that's somehow considered science. I think there's an extraordinary contradiction in that whole damn study, which many people have had great reservations about.

COMMENT: You wonder why he didn't study the authority question, the psychology of the authority figure?

COMMENT: Well, indeed. The point is, he is caught up in there as participant and not simply as observer. And I think that has to be pointed out as a very weird thing about the study.

The other thing I wanted to point out that's weird about that study is in his analysis of it, which I think is remarkably shallow on many grounds, one of which you pointed out, which I think is the most crucial one, of where someone does resist, for God's sake why don't we find out why they resisted? "Oh, I'm not interested"? What the hell does that mean, "Oh, I'm not interested in why people don't resist." I mean, there's something almost ghoulish about his absorption in the acquiescence to the authority and his indifference to the person who, after all, is the social hero, I think. The person who says I won't. He kind of says, well, you know, I didn't have time for that, or let somebody else -- that's odd. The other thing, the other piece ... which I think is very disturbing is, it's possible not to leave the -- as Milgram does, as "Wow, isn't this something. Golly, I sure showed you something rotten about human beings." Which is more or less the gist of the research. But rather that there is a theory of personality which makes it clear to us that people, in fact, have parts of the self that wouldn't mind engaging in some cruelty, in some barbarism, in some destructive behavior, but that the conscience prohibits that in the ordinarily socialized person. The authority is not just someone one defers to because we're taught in the first grade to defer to authority. The authority takes over the conscience. The authority says, you may do this. Soldiers classically like to rape and kill and loot because someone else takes the moral responsibility for it. And I think what Milgram never sees is that his subjects -- because he

never interviews them in this way. I mean, the interview is damn shallow, I think, all the way through the experiment -- he never tries to find out whether they, in fact, got some pleasure from that. Because he, who's trying to show us how rotten human beings are, can't imagine that there's a complex theory of personality which allows the authority to take over responsibility so in fact I can inflict pain even though another part of me hates that and will lead me to tremble and cry afterwards. I mean, it's a really shallow piece of work, and I think --

DE: There is, I think, a little contradiction in the points you've made, which are both valid and useful points. But notice your first point is premised on the idea that at least some of these people did suffer pain. That contradicts the notion that they were experiencing pleasure --

COMMENT: Excuse me, I have to tell you, come back to this room on Thursday.

DE: We should pursue it Thursday, I guess. Well, anybody who wants to stay, I'm happy to stay for a bit longer.

COMMENT: May I make an announcement before people leave. People may be familiar with [Nolan] bill last year that proposed to cut off military aid for the purpose of overturning the government in Nicaragua. It had no effect because the money was already pipelined. And of course it was passed again in the House a few weeks ago and defeated

in the Senate. So it now goes to a conference committee which is due to meet on Wednesday, to try to iron out differences. So the time right now to call congressman, senators, Democrat, Republican, is really immediate. Tomorrow, Wednesday morning, make sure they know that you care very much about --

DE: Do you know who's involved in the committee?

COMMENT: I called today, and I didn't get a call back from a single person.

DE: Who would know? Is there a place to call who would be on top of who to call?

COMMENT: I don't know.

COMMENT: I have a list of the phone numbers of all the representatives and senators from Massachusetts, if you want to --

DE: That's a very good idea. I would suggest one call a central lobbying office, like the Council for a Livable World, or Mobilization for Survival. They will know who the critical people in the conference are. They should know.

Two last points, then. I'll be glad to stay longer for people who can't come again or want to stay on. And for the rest of you, let me urge then those who haven't read the papers to read them, because there's plenty more to talk about in those papers. And those of you

who have read them might take another look at them and especially now start raising the question, what does seem left out here, what needs more exploring? Or, how does this apply? Whatever. But I think there's a lot more to discuss one more session.

So let's end formally now, and then anybody who wants to stay --

COMMENT: Well, the reason I think it's not a contradiction is that if one deals with the more complex theory of self, then there's a part of the self that's working against another part of the self. In fact, one part of the self wants to obey, maybe even wants to cause pain, and another part of the self is, in fact, horrified by the -- and the naive subject gets caught up in a conflict there, which is not a simple expression of deferring to authority or of causing pain, but of an actual conflict. And I think Milgram -- I mean, I obviously don't think a whole -- I'm grateful to him because he did this, and he showed it to us. At the same time I think he shouldn't have done it. I think we would have been better off if he'd found some other way to do it, and I think there are other ways to do that. But I think his analysis of it simply is a cheap, very limited analysis, because it's this kind of self-righteous, if you will, liberal triumph. You know, "ah, hah, I can show you, isn't that something people are that rotten." And, where does it leave you, in fact? The conclusion of the study is a kind of fatalistic conclusion, I think. "Well, that's the way it goes, folks, and maybe I'll get tenure out of this."

DE: I must say, I think that's unfair.

COMMENT: Well, it was a slick piece of research, is what I'm saying.

DE: Because when you say it could easily be demonstrated by other means, I'm not aware of a single other experiment that comes out with, that demonstrates the same results. Do you know of one? No one else has ever found one.

COMMENT: I don't think it exists.

DE: No one has ever done one on this very important piece that is as such. And second, I think you are down grading the real surprise and significance of the results, the extremity of the results.

COMMENT: No, no, I'm aware of --

DE: As if, you know, if he'd been more sophisticated, and so forth, we should have known, or we did know. In other words, my attitude is almost the opposite in some respects, in that I think I would want to take these experiments very seriously, I mean the results, and feel that they were quite significant -- and I'm not saying this would adjust it -- even had they been done in a Nazi concentration camp by somebody inflicting real pain, and whatnot. I'd say, well, that wasn't justifiable and that was horrible and all that. But these results are astounding results.

COMMENT: Oh indeed, they are.

DE: It seems they are separable from the process by which there -- and I don't think they're, in ethical terms, I don't think they are easily achievable otherwise. How could they be achievable in ways that did not cause any strain on the subject? The point of it is, you wouldn't have the demonstration that people could be led to obey despite feeling strain.

COMMENT: Right. I mean, I couldn't design that kind of laboratory experiment. I think the other ways of going about it would be quite different ways, would be case studies of real people in real situations, for instance.

DE: But that doesn't remotely get you to the point of the question of how many people will do this? Is it easily explained? Is it idiosyncratic or is it not? How could you get replicable results where you get very large numbers of people, the mass number of people? You know, one thing, by the way, that almost nobody remembers from the book, it's passed over rather quickly, is his comment that his first experimental design of the approach -- anybody remember what that was?

COMMENT: ... you couldn't hear the victim?

DE: When you couldn't hear anything. There was no feedback. Do you remember the results in that case? In the first ____ there was no feedback. It was just like the experiment with the following difference. Like the basic design, the person, the subject, the supposed victim, was in another room. But instead of yelling or pounding the

wall, you heard nothing from him. You just got his electronic signals back as to whether he was answering or not, and he stopped answering after 300 volts. Okay. Do you remember the results in the experiment? Does anybody remember? Everyone went all the way. They couldn't find anybody who stopped before the end. They included the pounding on the wall and the screaming and everything to start to get people who would begin to disobey. That's a pretty striking result there.

COMMENT: I have a question about the way the experiments are set up the subject is put in a conflict situation, right? So they get contradicting messages. Is that right? What they're seeing you're killing your victims, and they're hearing from these --

DE: No, consistent messages. The person is screaming and saying this is agony.

COMMENT: They're getting two messages, which is the experimenter saying "Go on, you're not going to hurt them permanently."

DE: In that sense, yeah.

COMMENT: I wonder if that really simulates a situation where someone knows they're killing the victim.

COMMENT: Like from high altitude bombing, for instance?

COMMENT: Right. Where you don't have any question. Nobody's telling

you this isn't really hurting them.

COMMENT: No, but you don't see any victim, I mean, you just do it.

COMMENT: No, but it has sometimes been a question whether the naive subject at some level doesn't think this isn't really happening. On this ____ university you're not going to be torturing somebody even if they're

DE: Let me ask, did you actually read the book as opposed to different articles?

COMMENT: I read the book, but a long time ago.

COMMENT: There's an extensive study on that particular point, whether they actually felt that --

DE: Well, they did ask people afterwards, "Did you believe the person was feeling pain?" "How much pain?" And so forth. And the answers were -- "and would you be willing to take the shock yourself, some of the shocks?" They were not going to take the shocks, and they did say they believed pain. Some said they were afraid the person was dead. Remember, it never says this will kill. It said highly dangerous.

COMMENT: Well on the board actually the last three boxes were XXX.

DE: I don't think it said lethal, actually. It said highly dangerous.

COMMENT: Isn't it -- I think it's XXX.

DE: So it didn't actually say lethal. But it implied the possibility of it. And they thought he was unconscious. A lot of them said they thought he was unconscious. That's why they were in such agony and so forth.

COMMENT: What did they _____ they were doing? I mean, what kind of people would go be subjects in this?

DE: You haven't read this?

COMMENT: Well, lots of people. People like us, apparently.

DE: Well, try to read it.

COMMENT: They didn't know what they were signing up for.

DE: No, here's the answer. They did -- not to go through it too much, because it's in the book, but they did say that. "This is ridiculous, I won't do it, I'm not going to do it anymore." Then they would be told by the experimenter "You must do it. The experiment requires it. You have no choice." And they did it. Crying, sweating.

COMMENT: Not all.

DE: Not all, no. Two thirds.

COMMENT: There were some who did not.

DE: Sixty-five percent of the American subjects went all the way in the basic form, which has the guy not in the room, but giving verbal and kicking feedback. Sixty-five percent went all the way. And see, of the others who broke off before all the way, most of them went very high on the scale, higher than anyone predicted that anyone would go, essentially. Even the ones who did break off went higher than that. And most people went all the way.

COMMENT: There was no secrecy --

COMMENT: I think that's really not true. I think there was a lot of secrecy involved.

COMMENT: What do you mean?

COMMENT: In the sense that you're talking about, that the secrecy -- that the subject was kept out of secrecy.

COMMENT: Absolutely, but not the level of inflicting pain. It was a way of distorting what was going on so that it was reconcilable with --

DE: But remember, they were assured -- and they did say this was critical to their thinking -- they were assured there was no "permanent damage, no tissue damage." They were aware, in other words, they

were torturing. They didn't want to believe and did not believe they were killing.

COMMENT: Now do you think if they'd been told they were torturing, if that word had been used --

DE: The word -- it would, of course, be in an entirely different context. Actually, Milgram showed me two papers he had that someone had sent him by a Greek who had studied the process of training torturers at the army police academy in Greece, when the colonels came over, and what it took to do it. There was a long selection process, by the way, but the selection process started, essentially, with random people, just people in the police academy. And then they went along and it was interesting to see what it took. But [end of tape]